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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-3097 
_______________ 
 
GREGORY S. MARKANTONE DPM, P.C; 
GREGORY S. MARKANTONE, 
 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
PODIATRIC BILLING SPECIALISTS, LLC 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-14-cv-00215) 
Magistrate Judge: Hon. Lisa P. Lenihan 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 17, 2015 
 
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 27, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
______________  
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge  
 Gregory Markantone runs a podiatry practice and claims a copyright interest in 
certain medical data that he describes as “office procedures, patient information, 
operational rules, and related data.” He admittedly has never registered his supposed 
copyright. Markantone entered into a licensing agreement with Podiatric Billing 
Specialists and, in connection with that agreement, Podiatric Billing came into possession 
of the medical data. After the agreement was terminated, Markantone demanded the 
return of his medical data, but Podiatric Billing refused unless Markantone paid it two 
thousand dollars. 
 This litigation followed, with Markantone and his medical practice asserting a 
claim for copyright infringement and various causes of action under Pennsylvania law. 
The District Court dismissed the federal copyright claim and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims as there is no diversity 
among the parties.1 
 Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, an action for infringement of a 
copyright may not be brought until the copyright is registered. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (“Section 411(a)’s registration 
requirement is a precondition to filing a claim.”). Acknowledging this requirement, 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6). Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). We review a 
district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. 
Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Markantone argues that “substantial justice” requires that we excuse registration in light 
of the purported Catch-22 he finds himself in: he cannot file a lawsuit for copyright 
infringement without registering the medical data, but he is unable to register the medical 
data because Podiatric Billing refuses to return it to him. Markantone cites no authority 
for what amounts to an equitable exception to the mandatory registration requirement. 
Nor will we consider such an argument. Markantone could have, as a precautionary 
matter, tried to register the medical data before entering into the licensing agreement. He 
also could pay the fee demanded by Podiatric Billing for the return of the medical data, 
register the copyright, and file suit afterwards if he believes he still has a cause of action. 
Additionally, Markantone could sue Podiatric Billing in Pennsylvania court. As we see it, 
Markantone’s reliance on his self-described conundrum is a misguided effort to pursue a 
state-law breach of contract claim under federal copyright law. 
  The complaint fails for the additional reason that, assuming he had a valid 
copyright, Markantone does not allege that Podiatric Billing violated any of his exclusive 
rights in the medical data. Copyright owners have the exclusive right to, among other 
things, reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform their works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Reed 
Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157; Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 68 (3d Cir. 2014) (“A 
copyright is better described as a bundle of rights.”). The closest Markantone comes to 
alleging a violation of his exclusive rights is his contention that Podiatric Billing is using 
the medical data against his “directive.” But this vague allegation says nothing about how 
Podiatric Billing is using the medical data in violation of copyright law. Markantone even 
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concedes in his brief that he does “not yet know if [Podiatric Billing] is copying the 
medical data, distributing it, performing it, displaying it, etc.” (Appellants’ Br. 17.) 
Without any basis for believing that Podiatric Billing is violating one or more of his 
exclusive rights, Markantone improperly requests permission to go on a fishing 
expedition.  
 Once the federal copyright claim was dismissed, the District Court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c); Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 174. Markantone challenges only one aspect of this 
issue on appeal. He maintains that one of the dismissed claims is actually based on federal 
rather than state law because it seeks a declaration that he may recover the medical data 
without violating any of Podiatric Billing’s copyrights. But Markantone cannot create 
federal jurisdiction by asserting claims or defenses Podiatric Billing might raise. See 
Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phila., 657 F.2d 29, 32-33 (3d 
Cir. 1981). And even if we assume this is a federal claim, it still must be dismissed 
because Markantone does not allege any facts showing that Podiatric Billing has 
threatened him with a copyright infringement suit.  
 For all these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order.  
